RT Article
T1 The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 17
IS 5
SP 499
OP 526
A1 Khader, Serene J.
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817473344
AB Abstract Feminist socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy make the presence of idealized social conditions necessary for autonomy. I argue that such conceptions cannot, when applied under nonideal conditions, play two key feminist theoretical roles for autonomy: the roles of anti-oppressive character ideal and paternalism-limiting concept. Instead, they prescribe action that reinforces oppression. Treated as character ideals, socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy ask agents living under nonideal ones to engage in self-harm or self-subordination. Moreover, conceptions of autonomy that make idealized social conditions a requirement of autonomy yield the conclusion that oppressed agents are appropriate objects of paternalism.
K1 Moral Psychology
K1 relational autonomy
K1 feminist philosophy
K1 Nonideal theory
K1 Oppression
K1 Autonomy
DO 10.1163/17455243-20203085