RT Article
T1 Relational Contractualism and Future Persons
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 13
IS 2
SP 135
OP 160
A1 Gibb, Michael
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2016
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817472763
AB A moral theory should tell us something about our obligations to future persons. It is therefore sometimes objected that contractualist moral theories cannot give a satisfactory account of such obligations, as there is little to motivate a contract with persons who can offer us almost nothing in return. I will argue that more recent “relational” forms of contractualism escape these objections. These forms of contractualism do, however, remain vulnerable to Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem. Recent attempts to resolve this problem have looked to the role “generic reasons” and “standpoints” play in contractualist theories. I argue that these views provide an important line of response in cases where the deliberating agent has limited information about the identities of those their actions will affect, but that the non-identity problem is not such a case. I conclude by considering some remaining options for the relational contractualist.
K1 relational moral theories
K1 non-identity problems
K1 future persons
K1 Contractualism
DO 10.1163/17455243-4681057