Role Modeling and Reasons: Developmental and Normative Grounds of Moral Virtues

It is uncontroversial that virtues and reasons are connected. But moral theorists differ widely regarding just what the connections are, and so far there has not been a fully adequate response to the question whether, in some important way, the category of reasons is more basic than that of virtues....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Audi, Robert (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2017
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2017, Volume: 14, Issue: 6, Pages: 646-668
Further subjects:B conceptual priority
B reasons-responsiveness
B aretaic responsiveness
B Telos (The Greek word)
B psychological priority
B Understanding
B primacy of reasons thesis
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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