Robust Alternatives and Responsibility
Abstract The Principle of Robust Alternatives (PRA) states that an agent is responsible for doing something only if he/she could have performed a ‘robust’ alternative: another action having a different moral or practical value. Defenders of PRA maintain that it is not refuted by a ‘Frankfurt case’,...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
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Brill
2004
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2004, Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Pages: 21-29 |
| Online Access: |
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| 520 | |a Abstract The Principle of Robust Alternatives (PRA) states that an agent is responsible for doing something only if he/she could have performed a ‘robust’ alternative: another action having a different moral or practical value. Defenders of PRA maintain that it is not refuted by a ‘Frankfurt case’, given that its agent can be seen as having had such an alternativeprovided that we properly qualify that for which she is responsible. I argue here against two versions of this defense. First, I show that those who maintain that a ‘Frankfurt agent’ is responsible forvoluntarily performing his/her action must attach moral significance to his/her luck. I proceed to discuss Carl Ginet's strategy of temporally qualifying ascriptions of responsibility, arguing that his counterexample to the principle that ‘If an agent is responsible for doing A t, then he/she is responsible for doing Asimpliciter’ is disanalogous to a Frankfurt case. | ||
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