Preferences’ Significance Does Not Depend on Their Content

Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people’s preferences such as “now-for-now” preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents—e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal—should be taken into account. I offe...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Williams, Evan G. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2016
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2016, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 211-234
Further subjects:B modal preferences
B preference fulfillment
B posthumous harm
B preference utilitarianism
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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