Responsibility and the Demands of Morality

Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: White, Stephen J. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2017
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2017, Volume: 14, Issue: 3, Pages: 315-338
Further subjects:B agent-centered prerogative
B Impartiality
B Utilitarianism
B Demandingness
B Responsibility
B Answerability
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Summary:Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes better sense of our intuitive reactions.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-46810062