On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming

According to action-relative accounts of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. Action-relative accounts can be contrasted with effect-relative accounts, which hold that an action may harm an indivi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gardner, Molly (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2017
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2017, Volume: 14, Issue: 1, Pages: 73-87
Further subjects:B non-comparative harming
B effect-relative accounts of harming
B Harm
B non-identity problem
B action-relative accounts of harming
B counterfactual accounts of harming
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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