Making Non-Transitive Betterness Behave
It is exceedingly plausible that the normative reason involving relations, ‘more reason to do than’ and ‘is rationally preferred to’, are transitive. Many philosophers and economists use the plausibility of covariation between these reason involving relations and the ‘better than’ relation to argue...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2018
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2018, Volume: 15, Issue: 5, Pages: 495-515 |
Further subjects: | B
Axiology
B Value Theory B non-transitivity B better than B choiceworthiness B Reason |
Online Access: |
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