Ignorance, Beneficence, and Rights

I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die...

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主要作者: Setiya, Kieran (Author)
格式: 电子 文件
语言:English
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出版: Brill 2020
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2020, 卷: 17, 发布: 1, Pages: 56-74
Further subjects:B Rights
B Rationality
B Beneficence
B Trolley Problem
B Reasons
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总结:I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20182841