Ignorance, Beneficence, and Rights
I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2020
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Dans: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Année: 2020, Volume: 17, Numéro: 1, Pages: 56-74 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Rights
B Rationality B Beneficence B Trolley Problem B Reasons |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20182841 |