Ignorance, Beneficence, and Rights

I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die...

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Autor principal: Setiya, Kieran (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Brill 2020
En: Journal of moral philosophy
Año: 2020, Volumen: 17, Número: 1, Páginas: 56-74
Otras palabras clave:B Rights
B Rationality
B Beneficence
B Trolley Problem
B Reasons
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.
ISSN:1745-5243
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20182841