Ignorance, Beneficence, and Rights

I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Setiya, Kieran (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2020
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Jahr: 2020, Band: 17, Heft: 1, Seiten: 56-74
weitere Schlagwörter:B Rights
B Rationality
B Beneficence
B Trolley Problem
B Reasons
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.
ISSN:1745-5243
Enthält:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20182841