The Personal and the Fitting
This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2014
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| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 11, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 341-352 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Fittingness
B buck-passing B Reasons B personal value |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the notion of good for a person—in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: (i) Rønnow-Rasmussen’s discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; (ii) his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of ‘for someone’s sake (fss) attitudes’; and (iii) his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01103001 |
