Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding

In this paper I argue against the charge that dependence on moral testimony is at odds with good moral agency, and moral specifically with the ideal of having moral understanding and using it to make moral judgments. My argument has four main strands. First, I contend that one of the grounds that is...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jane, McShane Paddy (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2018
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2018, Volume: 15, Issue: 3, Pages: 245-271
Further subjects:B Moral testimony
B Moral Virtue
B Moral Agency
B Moral Worth
B Moral understanding
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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