RT Article
T1 For the People, By the Viewpoints? Realism and Idealism in Public Reason
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 17
IS 5
SP 527
OP 557
A1 Jayaram, Athmeya
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817469894
AB Abstract Since John Rawls, public reason theorists have attempted to show how liberal political norms could be acceptable to people with diverse religious and ethical viewpoints. However, these theories overlook the importance of the distinction between acceptability to realistic people and acceptability to viewpoints, which matters because public reason theories are committed to the former, but only deliver the latter, thereby failing to justify liberal norms. Public reason theories therefore face a dilemma: abandon realistic people and lose normative appeal, or retain realism and find a new way to justify liberalism.
K1 Public Justification
K1 Public Reason
K1 Political Liberalism
K1 Gaus
K1 Rawls
DO 10.1163/17455243-20203129