Self-defence among Innocent People

Abstract I explain the asymmetry between innocent aggressors and their (innocent) victims, and attempt to separate justified and unjustified defensive force when both parties are innocent. I propose the principle of initiating behaviour, which states that: ‘In order for one person to be justified in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Øverland, Gerhard (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2005
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2005, Volume: 2, Issue: 2, Pages: 127-146
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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