RT Article
T1 Thinking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood on 'Ought'
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 7
IS 1
SP 133
OP 144
A1 Muijnck, Wim de
LA English
YR 2010
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1817469738
AB Abstract Ralph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to '. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that 'the intentional is normative'. I argue, first, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood's account leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance.
K1 OUGHTS
K1 Value
K1 Agency
K1 Rationality
K1 Normativity
K1 Metaphysics
DO 10.1163/174046809X12544019605987