Willing, Wanting, Waiting*
In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting Holton defends a comprehensive view of the will. His central claims are: (i) that we have a capacity of choice, independent of judgment about what is best to do, (ii) that resistance to temptation requires a special kind of intentions, resolutions, and the exerc...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2012
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2012, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, Pages: 443-457 |
Further subjects: | B
Choice
B Addiction B willpower B Temptation B Weakness of will B Intention B Will B resolution B Akrasia |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting Holton defends a comprehensive view of the will. His central claims are: (i) that we have a capacity of choice, independent of judgment about what is best to do, (ii) that resistance to temptation requires a special kind of intentions, resolutions, and the exercise of an executive capacity, willpower, (iii) there is a distinction between weakness of will and akrasia. I argue that Holton is right about these claims, but I raise a few concerns: (a) I am unclear about the philosophical import of (i); (b) I find that important details in the explanation of the working of willpower vis-à-vis temptation are missing and that there are inconsistencies in his account of addiction; (c) I would have liked a more extensive discussion of other possible defects of will; (d) I am unclear about the scope of the will and the relation of willpower to other executive capacities. I conclude with a brief assessment of the contribution of psychological studies to the philosophical investigation of intentions and the will. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-00903007 |