How Wrong is Paternalism?

In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concern...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Birks, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2018
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2018, Volume: 15, Issue: 2, Pages: 136-163
Further subjects:B Paternalism
B responsibility-catering prioritarianism
B Wellbeing
B Autonomy
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
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