Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap
Abstract The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo-Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically ju...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Published: |
Brill
2004
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2004, Volume: 1, Issue: 2, Pages: 197-209 |
| Online Access: |
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