Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap

Abstract The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo-Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically ju...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brown, Stephen 1958- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2004
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2004, Volume: 1, Issue: 2, Pages: 197-209
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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