Maitzen’s Objection from God’s Goodness
Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence ‘God is (morally) good’ is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams’ version of divine command metaethics is not...
| Опубликовано в: : | Sophia |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Springer Netherlands
2022
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| В: |
Sophia
Год: 2022, Том: 61, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 581-598 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
divine goodness
B Divine Command Theory B Divine command metaethics B Theological voluntarism B Moral semantics |
| Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence ‘God is (morally) good’ is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams’ version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accept this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen’s objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00861-5 |