Epistemic injustice in psychiatric practice: epistemic duties and the phenomenological approach

Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject (eg, a knower, a reasoner) is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic in...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Drożdżowicz, Anna (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: BMJ Publ. 2021
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2021, Volume: 47, Issue: 12
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 1816167088
003 DE-627
005 20230426125631.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220908s2021 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1136/medethics-2020-106679  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1816167088 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1816167088 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Drożdżowicz, Anna  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Epistemic injustice in psychiatric practice: epistemic duties and the phenomenological approach 
264 1 |c 2021 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject (eg, a knower, a reasoner) is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic injustice that they encounter in psychiatric services. Acknowledging that epistemic injustice is a multifaceted problem in psychiatry calls for an adequate response. In this paper I argue that, given that psychiatric patients deserve epistemic respect and have a certain epistemic privilege, healthcare professionals have a pro tanto epistemic duty to attend to and/or solicit reports of patients’ first-person experiences in order to prevent epistemic losses. I discuss the nature and scope of this epistemic duty and point to one interesting consequence. In order to prevent epistemic losses, healthcare professionals may need to provide some patients with resources and tools for expressing their experiences and first-person knowledge, such as those that have been developed within the phenomenological approach. I discuss the risk of secondary testimonial and hermeneutical injustice that the practice of relying on such external tools might pose and survey some ways to mitigate it. 
601 |a Episteme 
601 |a Psychiatrie 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Journal of medical ethics  |d London : BMJ Publ., 1975  |g 47(2021), 12, Artikel-ID 69  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)323607802  |w (DE-600)2026397-1  |w (DE-576)260773972  |x 1473-4257  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:47  |g year:2021  |g number:12  |g elocationid:69 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106679  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u http://jme.bmj.com/content/47/12/e69.abstract  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
936 u w |d 47  |j 2021  |e 12  |i 69 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4185621035 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1816167088 
LOK |0 005 20220908053815 
LOK |0 008 220908||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-08-03#CBCA5C392CA9AAD8D8CECA9B11827E1621136344 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
OAS |a 1  |b inherited from superior work 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw