Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to Christensen

In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a su...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Blackshaw, P. (Author) ; Rodger, Daniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: BMJ Publ. 2019
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 45, Issue: 7, Pages: 478-479
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 1816160466
003 DE-627
005 20230428063518.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220908s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1136/medethics-2018-105267  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1816160466 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1816160466 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Blackshaw, P.  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to Christensen 
264 1 |c 2019 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder is also not grounded in the badness of death, which is strongly counterintuitive. There is an alternative: we can save our intuitions by adopting a more moderate Epicurean account such as that proposed by David Hershenov, who grounds the wrongness of killing in the prevention of the benefit of further good life rather than in the badness of death. Hershenov’s account, however, is equally applicable to Marquis’ argument: abortion similarly prevents a fetus from enjoying the benefit of a future like ours. Consequently, we conclude that Christensen’s criticism of Marquis’ argument fails to undermine his reasoning. 
601 |a Challenger 
700 1 |a Rodger, Daniel  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Journal of medical ethics  |d London : BMJ Publ., 1975  |g 45(2019), 7, Seite 478-479  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)323607802  |w (DE-600)2026397-1  |w (DE-576)260773972  |x 1473-4257  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:45  |g year:2019  |g number:7  |g pages:478-479 
856 |u https://openresearch.lsbu.ac.uk/download/cf095f3a4c3762687fef916b7b54288912938603410d1f81fbf27f6919d3456d/16269/MEETING%20THE%20EPICUREAN%20CHALLENGE_%20A%20REPLY%20TO%20CHRISTENSEN.docx  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h repository [oa repository (via OAI-PMH doi match)] 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-105267  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u http://jme.bmj.com/content/45/7/478.abstract  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4185614411 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1816160466 
LOK |0 005 20220908053737 
LOK |0 008 220908||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-08-03#D68D3F6251185E5A23FC043CF069973271CFA6EA 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw