Autonomy, nudging and post-truth politics

In his excellent essay, ‘Nudges in a post-truth world’, Neil Levy argues that ‘nudges to reason’, or nudges which aim to make us more receptive to evidence, are morally permissible. A strong argument against the moral permissibility of nudging is that nudges fail to respect the autonomy of the indiv...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Keeling, Geoff (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 2018
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 44, Issue: 10, Pages: 721-722
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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