What sort of person could have a radically extended lifespan?

The literature on human enhancement is awash with discussions about whether it really would be desirable to increase our lifespan, cognitive power, physical strength (etc.) above and beyond that which we currently consider to be healthy or normal. Almost all of these discussions hang on the question...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Roache, Rebecca (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: BMJ Publ. 2018
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 44, Issue: 4, Pages: 217-218
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 181615749X
003 DE-627
005 20230428063455.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220908s2018 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1136/medethics-2018-104840  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)181615749X 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP181615749X 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Roache, Rebecca  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a What sort of person could have a radically extended lifespan? 
264 1 |c 2018 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a The literature on human enhancement is awash with discussions about whether it really would be desirable to increase our lifespan, cognitive power, physical strength (etc.) above and beyond that which we currently consider to be healthy or normal. Almost all of these discussions hang on the question of whether it makes sense to draw a morally relevant distinction between those interventions that count as therapies and those that count as enhancements. Roughly, therapies are interventions that aim to restore health or normality to capacities or functions that are diseased or otherwise operating at a sub-normal level; enhancements aim to improve on the healthy or normal level of functioning.Focusing on the case of lifespan enhancement, Andrea Sauchelli considers the desirability of enhancement from a perspective that is independent of the debate about the therapy/enhancement distinction. His starting point is an argument from Walter Glannon, who holds that ‘deep life-extending technologies’—Sauchelli’s term for ‘those technologies that purport to eliminate, in principle endlessly, the physically and/or mentally corrupting effects of the process of ageing’ (insert page ref. to Sauchelli’s article)—cannot coherently be desirable for beings like us, that is, persons. Glannon’s argument is, roughly, that any person X considering using deep life-extending technologies would be so psychologically dissimilar to the person Y whose mental life is a technologically-extended continuation of X’s mental life that X and Y cannot be said to be the same person. Glannon believes that a person literally cannot survive too large an increase in lifespan, where ‘too large an increase’ is one that renders the subject of the later stages of that lifespan so psychologically dissimilar to the subject of its earlier stages that the two subjects are not the same person. As Sauchelli notes, Glannon’s argument is premised on a psychological theory of personal identity of the … 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Journal of medical ethics  |d London : BMJ Publ., 1975  |g 44(2018), 4, Seite 217-218  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)323607802  |w (DE-600)2026397-1  |w (DE-576)260773972  |x 1473-4257  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:44  |g year:2018  |g number:4  |g pages:217-218 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/26879704  |x JSTOR 
856 |u https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/44/4/217.full.pdf  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h publisher [open (via free pdf)] 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-104840  |x Resolving-System  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u http://jme.bmj.com/content/44/4/217.abstract  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4185611439 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 181615749X 
LOK |0 005 20220908053719 
LOK |0 008 220908||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-08-03#036718FFD113A6CD41A6DBBD9162200F1F0B230F 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/26879704 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw