Do the ‘brain dead’ merely appear to be alive?

The established view regarding ‘brain death’ in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such ind...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Nair-Collins, Michael (Author) ; Miller, Gabriele 1923-2010 (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 2017
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2017, Volume: 43, Issue: 11, Pages: 747-753
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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