Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection
Schuklenk and Smalling argue that it is practically impossible for civic institutions to meet the conditions necessary to ensure that conscientious objection does not conflict with the core principles of liberal democracies. In this response, I propose an alternative definition of conscience to that...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
BMJ Publ.
2017
|
| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2017, Volume: 43, Issue: 4, Pages: 245-247 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000caa a22000002 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 181615542X | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230426115855.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220908s2017 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1136/medethics-2016-103702 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)181615542X | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KXP181615542X | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 084 | |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Symons, Xavier |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2017 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Schuklenk and Smalling argue that it is practically impossible for civic institutions to meet the conditions necessary to ensure that conscientious objection does not conflict with the core principles of liberal democracies. In this response, I propose an alternative definition of conscience to that offered by Schuklenk and Smalling. I discuss what I call the ‘traditional’ notion of conscience, and contrast this with the existentialist conception of conscience (which I take to be a close cousin of the view targeted by Schuklenk and Smalling). I argue that the traditional notion, grounded in an objective moral order, avoids the criticisms advanced by Schuklenk and Smalling; the existentialist conception, in contrast, does not. I conclude by discussing the benefits and risks of a ‘restricted view’ of respect for conscience. | ||
| 601 | |a conscience | ||
| 601 | |a Problem | ||
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of medical ethics |d London : BMJ Publ., 1975 |g 43(2017), 4, Seite 245-247 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)323607802 |w (DE-600)2026397-1 |w (DE-576)260773972 |x 1473-4257 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:43 |g year:2017 |g number:4 |g pages:245-247 |
| 856 | |3 Volltext |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/44606264 |x JSTOR | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103702 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://jme.bmj.com/content/43/4/245.abstract |x Verlag |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 935 | |a mteo | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| ELC | |a 1 | ||
| ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
| LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
| LOK | |0 001 4185609361 | ||
| LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
| LOK | |0 004 181615542X | ||
| LOK | |0 005 20220908053707 | ||
| LOK | |0 008 220908||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
| LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-08-03#C980D0B8BEAE0CBA5C2A9956D33D72B8D2B8238F | ||
| LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
| LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
| LOK | |0 866 |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/44606264 | ||
| LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixrk |a zota | ||
| OAS | |a 1 |b inherited from superior work | ||
| ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||