Is prostitution harmful?
A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable—we believe in the acceptabil...
Τόπος έκδοσης: | Journal of medical ethics |
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Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
BMJ Publ.
2014
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of medical ethics
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Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable—we believe in the acceptability of casual sex. In this paper I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no reasons to reject prostitution. I do so by first examining nine influential arguments to the contrary. These arguments purport to pin down the alleged additional harm brought about by prostitution (compared to just casual sex) by appealing to various aspects of its practice, such as its psychology, physiology, economics and social meaning. For each argument I explain why it is unconvincing. I then weight the costs against the benefits of prostitution, and argue that, in sum, prostitution is no more harmful than a long line of occupations that we commonly accept without hesitation. |
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ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2011-100367 |