Genetic enhancement, post-persons and moral status: a reply to Buchanan

Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: DeGrazia, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 2012
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2012, Volume: 38, Issue: 3, Pages: 135-139
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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