The problems with utilitarian conceptions of personhood in the abortion debate

This article seeks to explore utilitarian conceptions of personhood which for a long time have been employed as part of a rational moral justification for the termination of pregnancy. Michael Tooley's desires-based rights approach to personhood presented in his work Abortion and Infanticide is...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cox, R. A. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 2011
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2011, Volume: 37, Issue: 5, Pages: 318-320
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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