Embryonic stem cell research is not dehumanising us

It is not possible on naturalistic grounds to argue either for or against an entity such as the human embryo having full moral status and deserving our fullest moral attention. In addition, it is difficult to see the point of asserting this moral status. Instead of citing nature as the grounds for d...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Klostergaard, L. (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
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Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Έκδοση: BMJ Publ. 2009
Στο/Στη: Journal of medical ethics
Έτος: 2009, Τόμος: 35, Τεύχος: 12, Σελίδες: 774-777
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:It is not possible on naturalistic grounds to argue either for or against an entity such as the human embryo having full moral status and deserving our fullest moral attention. In addition, it is difficult to see the point of asserting this moral status. Instead of citing nature as the grounds for demarcating moral status, perhaps it would be better to look at the decisions and activities that demarcate nature and establish the nature-culture gap. Our decisions and activities are expressions of our understanding of ourselves and I would like to argue that when considering the human embryo the real question we should be asking is what kinds of actions are dehumanising us.
ISSN:1473-4257
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1136/jme.2009.030320