On Norman Daniels’ interpretation of the moral significance of healthcare

According to Norman Daniels, the moral significance of health needs stem from their impact on the normal opportunity range: pathological conditions involve comparative disadvantage. In this paper I defend an alternative reading of the moral importance of healthcare, which focuses on non-comparative...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schramme, T. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 2009
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2009, Volume: 35, Issue: 1, Pages: 17-20
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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520 |a According to Norman Daniels, the moral significance of health needs stem from their impact on the normal opportunity range: pathological conditions involve comparative disadvantage. In this paper I defend an alternative reading of the moral importance of healthcare, which focuses on non-comparative aspects of disease. In the first section I distinguish two contrasting perspectives on pathological conditions, viz a comparative versus a non-comparative. By using this distinction I introduce a related disparity regarding the moral importance of personal responsibility for disease. I claim that people are usually prepared to disregard individual responsibility for disease, if it involves non-comparative harm, but not if it entails mere disadvantage. Since disadvantage means to have less than equal opportunities, Daniels’ conception of opportunity is vital for his theory. It is therefore scrutinised more closely. I try to show that he wavers between two interpretations of the notion of opportunity, which are again linked to the distinction between a comparative and a non-comparative point of view. Finally, I criticise Daniels’ supposition that persons have an interest in the normal opportunity range. 
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