What’s not wrong with conditional organ donation?
In a well known British case, the relatives of a dead man consented to the use of his organs for transplant on the condition that they were transplanted only into white people. The British government condemned the acceptance of racist offers and the panel they set up to report on the case condemned...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
BMJ Publ.
2003
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of medical ethics
Έτος: 2003, Τόμος: 29, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 163-164 |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | In a well known British case, the relatives of a dead man consented to the use of his organs for transplant on the condition that they were transplanted only into white people. The British government condemned the acceptance of racist offers and the panel they set up to report on the case condemned all conditional offers of donation. The panel appealed to a principle of altruism and meeting the greatest need. This paper criticises their reasoning. The panel’s argument does not show that conditional donation is always wrong and anyway overlooks a crucial distinction between making an offer and accepting it. But even the most charitable reinterpretation of the panel’s argument does not reject selective acceptance of conditional offers. The panel’s reasoning has no merit. |
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ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/jme.29.3.163 |