Bioethics and caring

The author agrees with the critiques of moral theory offered by such writers as Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre, and uses ideas from Heidegger and Levinas to argue that caring is an ontological structure of human existence which takes two forms: caring about on self (which he calls our "...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: van Hooft, S. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: BMJ Publ. 1996
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 1996, Volume: 22, Issue: 2, Pages: 83-89
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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