Islamic Beliefs and Epistemic Defeaters: a Response to Baldwin and McNabb
In this paper, I outline some exegetical and philosophical problems with Baldwin and McNabb’s epistemic defeater for Islamic beliefs. I maintain that their argument is based upon a misinterpretation of Quranic verses. I also argue that exceptional instances of divine deception inflicted upon the sen...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2022
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 2022, 卷: 61, 發布: 2, Pages: 445-456 |
| Further subjects: | B
Proper functionalism
B Islamic epistemology B Epistemic defeater B Plantinga |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 總結: | In this paper, I outline some exegetical and philosophical problems with Baldwin and McNabb’s epistemic defeater for Islamic beliefs. I maintain that their argument is based upon a misinterpretation of Quranic verses. I also argue that exceptional instances of divine deception inflicted upon the senses, if they indeed happen, should not undermine the general trust in our cognitive faculties. I conclude that virtually all Muslims are immune from Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed defeater and from the threat posed by divine deception in general. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00866-0 |
