Islamic Beliefs and Epistemic Defeaters: a Response to Baldwin and McNabb
In this paper, I outline some exegetical and philosophical problems with Baldwin and McNabb’s epistemic defeater for Islamic beliefs. I maintain that their argument is based upon a misinterpretation of Quranic verses. I also argue that exceptional instances of divine deception inflicted upon the sen...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2022
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 61, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 445-456 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Proper functionalism
B Islamic epistemology B Epistemic defeater B Plantinga |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this paper, I outline some exegetical and philosophical problems with Baldwin and McNabb’s epistemic defeater for Islamic beliefs. I maintain that their argument is based upon a misinterpretation of Quranic verses. I also argue that exceptional instances of divine deception inflicted upon the senses, if they indeed happen, should not undermine the general trust in our cognitive faculties. I conclude that virtually all Muslims are immune from Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed defeater and from the threat posed by divine deception in general. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00866-0 |
