RT Article
T1 Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism as Ethical Naturalism
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 19
IS 4
SP 335
OP 360
A1 Moosavi, Parisa
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2022
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1814219366
AB Neo-Aristotelian naturalism purports to explain morality in terms of human nature, while maintaining that the relevant aspects of human nature cannot be known scientifically. This has led some to conclude that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is not a form of ethical naturalism in the standard, metaphysical sense. In this paper, I argue that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is in fact a standard form of ethical naturalism that is committed to metaphysical naturalism about moral truths and presents a distinctive and underappreciated argument for it. I reconstruct the neo-Aristotelian argument for ethical naturalism in terms of a continuity between the ethical domain and the natural domain of life. I argue that clarifying the meta-ethical import of neo-Aristotelian naturalism not only helps to situate it among other positions in meta-ethics, but also facilitates better critical engagement with the view.
K1 Philippa Foot
K1 neo-Aristotelian naturalism
K1 natural goodness
K1 Moral Virtue
K1 ethical naturalism
DO 10.1163/17455243-20223474