RT Article
T1 Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 12
IS 3
SP 193
OP 194
A1 Kaplan, Mark 1951-
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2022
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1813926212
AB Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. The book also provides evidence of just how fruitful an epistemology is to be had, once we take that critique to heart and do epistemology as Austin thought it should be done.
K1 Austin’s fidelity requirement
K1 Ordinary Language
K1 Skepticism
K1 J. L. Austin
DO 10.1163/22105700-bja10039