Blame for me and Not for Thee: Status Sensitivity and Moral Responsibility

In our day-to-day lives, we form responsibility judgements about one another - but we are imperfect beings, and our judgments can be mistaken. This paper suggests that we get things wrong not merely by chance, but predictably and systematically. In particular, these miscues are common when we are de...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Argetsinger, Henry (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2022
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2022, Volume: 25, Issue: 2, Pages: 265-282
Further subjects:B Ethics of blame
B Social status
B Moral Responsibility
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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520 |a In our day-to-day lives, we form responsibility judgements about one another - but we are imperfect beings, and our judgments can be mistaken. This paper suggests that we get things wrong not merely by chance, but predictably and systematically. In particular, these miscues are common when we are dealing with large gaps in social status and power. That is, when we form judgements about those who are much more or less socially powerful than ourselves, it is increasingly likely that "epistemic distorters" will reliably disrupt our reasoning. In response to this situation, I argue for the introduction of a new norm concerning blame and social status: "Powerful Restraint." This norm suggests that the socially powerful ought to blame the socially dispossessed less frequently, and that social pressure be applied to achieve that compliance. I argue that such a norm is justified given the pernicious down-stream moral effects of the up-stream epistemic distortion I describe. I defend it against objections that it suggests a normative solution to an epistemic problem, that it is paternalistic, and that it involves a kind of disrespect to the less socially powerful. 
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