An Exercise in Moral Philosophy: Seeking to Understand “nobody”
The late Hannah Arendt proposed that many, perhaps most monstrous deeds are not committed by moral monsters but by individuals who do not “think.” However, understanding the significance of “activity of thinking as such” requires a moral philosophy that transcends rational actor assumptions and inst...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
1997
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| Στο/Στη: |
Teaching business ethics
Έτος: 1997, Τόμος: 1, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 63-91 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Ethics
B Morality B banality of evil B systems theory B Moral Philosophy B Evil B cognition and institutions B Self-knowledge B cognition and morality B information distortion |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | The late Hannah Arendt proposed that many, perhaps most monstrous deeds are not committed by moral monsters but by individuals who do not “think.” However, understanding the significance of “activity of thinking as such” requires a moral philosophy that transcends rational actor assumptions and instrumental reason centering, instead, on the conditions of self-knowledge. The ubiquitous and often lethal phenomenon of information distortions provides a vehicle for expanding our understandings of individual moral response-abilities in our modern times. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-1944 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Teaching business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1009787710014 |