Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism
While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
2022
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 91, Issue: 3, Pages: 163-175 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ Probability
/ Evolution
/ Naturalism (Philosophy)
/ Cognition theory
/ Conviction
/ Objectivity
/ Bayes' rule
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IxTheo Classification: | VA Philosophy VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Full and partial belief
B Defeaters B Probability B evolutionary argument against naturalism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial of traditional theism, making them unsuitable for Plantinga’s purpose here. With respect to epistemic interpretations, I note that standard Bayesianism is too permissive for Plantinga’s purposes. I then argue that Plantinga’s use of the Principle of Indifference is at odds with his Reformed Epistemology. I conclude with some suggestions for how defenders of the argument might proceed. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09818-7 |