Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga-Type Ontological Argument

The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Erasmus, Jacob ca. 20./21. Jh. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 2022
In: Heythrop journal
Year: 2022, Volume: 63, Issue: 2, Pages: 196-209
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
TK Recent history
VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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520 |a The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility-premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility-premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi-maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility-premise, the Plantinga-type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility-premise. 
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