Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga-Type Ontological Argument
The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
|
In: |
Heythrop journal
Year: 2022, Volume: 63, Issue: 2, Pages: 196-209 |
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism TK Recent history VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
MARC
LEADER | 00000caa a22000002 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 1799697282 | ||
003 | DE-627 | ||
005 | 20220427212317.0 | ||
007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 220416s2022 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1111/heyj.13682 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (DE-627)1799697282 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1799697282 | ||
040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
041 | |a eng | ||
084 | |a 0 |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
100 | 1 | |e VerfasserIn |0 (DE-588)1245582313 |0 (DE-627)1777282144 |4 aut |a Erasmus, Jacob |d ca. 20./21. Jh. | |
109 | |a Erasmus, Jacob ca. 20./21. Jh. |a Erasmus, Jacobus ca. 20./21. Jh. | ||
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga-Type Ontological Argument |
264 | 1 | |c 2022 | |
336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility-premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility-premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi-maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility-premise, the Plantinga-type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility-premise. | ||
601 | |a Ontologie | ||
601 | |a Argumentation | ||
652 | |a AB:TK:VB | ||
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Heythrop journal |d Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, 1960 |g 63(2022), 2, Seite 196-209 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)320573052 |w (DE-600)2016721-0 |w (DE-576)094425485 |x 1468-2265 |7 nnns |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:63 |g year:2022 |g number:2 |g pages:196-209 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.13682 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/heyj.13682 |x Verlag |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
935 | |a mteo | ||
951 | |a AR | ||
ELC | |a 1 | ||
ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
LOK | |0 001 4118135574 | ||
LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
LOK | |0 004 1799697282 | ||
LOK | |0 005 20240319114330 | ||
LOK | |0 008 220416||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-04-15#B40D545055001FF52F7910F52139E7E00EB95962 | ||
LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a zota | ||
LOK | |0 936ln |0 1442042990 |a AB | ||
LOK | |0 936ln |0 144205381X |a VB | ||
LOK | |0 936ln |0 1442053887 |a TK | ||
ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||
REL | |a 1 | ||
SUB | |a REL |