Evil and maximal greatness
By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have...
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格式: | 电子 文件 |
语言: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
出版: |
2022
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, 卷: 91, 发布: 2, Pages: 93-109 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ 神存在的本体论论证
/ 情态
/ Größe
/ Maximum
/ 批评
/ 罪恶
/ 恶性循环 (哲学)
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Modal problem of evil
B Maximal greatness B Modal ontological argument B Plantinga |
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