Evil and maximal greatness
By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2022
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, 卷: 91, 发布: 2, Pages: 93-109 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ 神存在的本体论论证
/ 情态
/ Größe
/ Maximum
/ 批评
/ 罪恶
/ 恶性循环 (哲学)
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Modal problem of evil
B Maximal greatness B Modal ontological argument B Plantinga |
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by Tooley (Mind 90:422–427, 1981) and Guleserian (Nous 17:221–238, 1983), against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09810-1 |
