La définition de la personne, relation et sujet

Must personhood be defined through relationship, as trinitarian theology has done, or through an absolute element, as christologists have tended to do? Such discrepancy cannot be justified by simply observing that the human persons are endowed with a more absolute character. Human persons are indeed...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Galot, Jean 1919-2008 (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:French
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana 1994
In: Gregorianum
Year: 1994, Volume: 75, Issue: 2, Pages: 281-299
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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520 |a Must personhood be defined through relationship, as trinitarian theology has done, or through an absolute element, as christologists have tended to do? Such discrepancy cannot be justified by simply observing that the human persons are endowed with a more absolute character. Human persons are indeed created in the image of the divine persons and have a reality analogous to theirs. Recent attempts at attributing an absolute character to the person of the Father meet with unsurmountable objections. It should be admitted that relational being is proper to the person; but an important observation needs to be made regarding current language. When referring to the human person, the term «person» tends generally to designate the entirety of the human being — person and nature — in such a way that the absolute element that characterises nature is attributed to the person, in the broad sense of that totality. If the person, as distinct from the nature, is given its proper meaning, it needs to be added that its relational character does not prevent it from being the subject of activity; the reason is that relational being is no mere logical entity, but possesses its proper subsistence, that is, its relational subsistence. As subject of activity, the person accomplishes through nature what pertains to its own dynamism. Its quality as being subject expresses the person's autonomy, which governs the unfolding of the faculties of nature. 
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