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In contemporary moral theology remarkable emphasis is put on the role of experience. The main question is: What does experience contribute to the perception of moral values and consequently to the proper formulation of operative norms? The present article deals with this problem and tries to come to...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1978
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1978, Volume: 59, Issue: 4, Pages: 661-690 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | In contemporary moral theology remarkable emphasis is put on the role of experience. The main question is: What does experience contribute to the perception of moral values and consequently to the proper formulation of operative norms? The present article deals with this problem and tries to come to a deeper understanding of the value and the function of experience in so far as it is morally relevant. Its starting point is the undoubted fact, that experience reflects the historicity of man with all its anthropological implications. It develops, as a first step, some basic ideas regarding historicity as anthropological category, i.e. as rooted in human freedom. These basic considerations are followed by a second step, which stresses the link between experience and freedom: Certainly the human being gathers experiences first of all from facts, but always mediated by freedom in the face of facts. Through experience with freedom he learns to come to a fuller knowledge of his possibilities. A final third step intends to make clear how there is no « reified » experience, i.e. separated from insight: He gathers experiences through insights, mediated by freedom, and thus moral insight is by its very nature free insight. To be morally relevant experience depends on interpretation, in which the self-understanding of the moral subject is operative. It is this mutual interdependence of experience, freedom and insight which generates operative moral norms. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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