An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness
It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literat...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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В: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2022, Том: 91, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 23-41 |
Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Объяснение
/ Онтология (работа со знаниями)
/ Теория познания
/ Принцип
/ Достаточная причина
/ Теизм
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Индексация IxTheo: | AB Философия религии VA Философия VB Герменевтика ; Философия |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Epistemology
B Explanations B Brute facts B Classical Theism B The principle of sufficient reason |
Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Итог: | It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y |