RT Article
T1 Governing [through] Autonomy. The Moral and Legal Limits of “Soft Paternalism”
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 17
IS 3
SP 383
OP 397
A1 Fateh-Moghadam, Bijan 1970-
A1 Gutmann, Thomas 1964-
A2 Gutmann, Thomas 1964-
LA English
YR 2014
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785698176
AB Legal restrictions of the right to self-determination increasingly pretend to be compatible with the liberal concept of autonomy: they act upon a ‘soft’ or autonomy-orientated paternalistic rationale. Conventional liberal critique of paternalism turns out to be insensitive to the intricate normative problems following from ‘soft’ or ‘libertarian’ paternalism. In fact, these autonomy-oriented forms of paternalism could actually be even more problematic and may infringe liberty rights even more intensely than hard paternalistic regulation. This paper contributes to the systematic differentiation of soft and hard paternalism by discussing the (legal) concept of autonomy and elaborates the moral and legal limits of autonomy-orientated paternalism.
K1 Libertarian paternalism
K1 Autonomy-oriented paternalism
K1 Weak paternalism
K1 Soft paternalism
K1 Autonomy
DO 10.1007/s10677-013-9450-3