Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation
According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the dis...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2014
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2014, Volume: 17, Issue: 2, Pages: 253-267 |
| Further subjects: | B
Motivation
B Desire B Moral Judgment B Occurrent states of mind B Expressivism B Dispositional states of mind |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |